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Abstract—In the smart grid, smart meters, and numerous
control and monitoring applications employ bidirectional wire-
less communication, where security is a critical issue. In key
management based encryption method for the smart grid, the
Trusted Third Party (TTP), and links between the smart meter
and the third party are assumed to be fully trusted and reliable.
However, in wired/wireless medium, a man-in-middle may want
to interfere, monitor and control the network, thus exposing its
vulnerability. Acknowledging this, in this paper, we propose a
novel two level encryption method based on two partially trusted
simple servers (constitutes the TTP) which implement this method
without increasing packet overhead. One server is responsible
for data encryption between the meter and control center/central
database, and the other server manages the random sequence of
data transmission. Numerical calculation shows that the number
of iterations required to decode a message is large which is
quite impractical. Furthermore, we introduce One-class support
vector machine (machine learning) algorithm for node-to-node
authentication utilizing the location information and the data
transmission history (node identity, packet size and frequency of
transmission). This secures data communication privacy without
increasing the complexity of the conventional key management
scheme.
Keywords—AMI, Key Management Scheme (KMS), localization,
machine learning, One-class Support Vector Machine, RSS, smart
grid, smart meter.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart grid is the modern power system infrastructure whose
distribution system is upgraded via bidirectional communica-
tion, and pervasive and intelligent computing capabilities in
order to provide improved control, efficiency, reliability and
safety. In the arena of smart grid, the Advanced Metering
Infrastructure (AMI) is the distribution level building block. It
consists of millions of meters interlinked by a hierarchical or
mesh-connected or hybrid network. The meters communicate
with the control center in a wireless fashion. The typical
communication standards for the AMI are ZigBee, WiFi and
LTE [1]. In the AMI, smart meters collect and store the
instantaneous energy consumption and report it periodically
to the back office (the control center) as against reporting of
monthly total energy consumption recorded in the conventional
meters. It also allows the consumers to actively engage in
electricity trade by selling home- generated, unused electricity
(from solar panel, windmill etc.) to the grid. AMI also outfits
the service provider with control and monitoring equipment,
including outage management, demand response, and disaster
prevention and recovery information.
Since AMI has to use wireless communication, security
issues become a critical problem. Observing the usage patterns,
an adversary/thief can predict the presence of the targeted con-
sumers at home which can be a threat to civil lives and privacy.
This research was supported in part through U.S. National Science Foun-
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Furthermore, from the fine grained energy consumption data,
the home appliance companies receive information about the
life style patterns of consumers and the energy utilization of
their home appliances. Thus competing companies can use this
valuable information in their businesses. The consumers might
want to alter the consumption data to reduce their electricity
bill. The most crucial thing is that the opponent/hacker might
jam or take over the AMI network by sending false signal
to meters on an unsecured system, which may cause power
outage in a wide area as well as an imbalance in the demand
generation model.
Like all other systems, AMI needs to comply with the
requirements of security- confidentiality, integrity, availability
and accountability (non-repudiation) [2], [3]. Confidentially
implies the accessibility of data by any authorized entity, and
any intentional or unintentional disclosures of data must be
denied. Since the main objective of the AMI is to collect
energy consumption information that conveys consumer life
patterns, habits and energy usage, this data must be concealed.
Integrity requires reflecting authentic data correctly without
any modifications, additions, or deletions. If any unauthorized
subject performs (or attempts to perform) such actions, this
must be detected. Since not only the hacker, but also the
consumer, might want to alter the consumption data by trap-
ping and resending, the integrity of data is very important.
Availability requires the accessibility of data by an authorized
user on demand. If the required data is not found at the time
of need, the system violates the availability aspect of the
security requirement of the system. Any natural or intentional
incidents (i.e. hacking) must not hamper the system from
operating correctly. For example, if the hacker wants to jam the
network, the system must comply with the availability aspect.
Accountability (non-repudiation) means non-deniability of an
action, i.e., the entities used in receiving or transmitting data
must not deny it. If an entity does not receive data, it will not,
subsequently, state that it has received it. In the AMI network,
accountability ensures a timely response to the command and
control, and integrity of billing profile, etc.
The main drawback of implementing security scheme in
AMI is the limited memory and low computational ability
of the smart meters. Furthermore, AMI is a huge network,
consists of millions of meters. So we need a lightweight but
robust security scheme. In the literature, the key management-
based encryption method has been proposed as a prominent
security scheme for smart grid, which includes a Trusted Third
Party (TTP) [4]–[6]. In all TTP management systems, it is
assumed that the TTP is fully trusted. However, the TTP itself,
and the meters and communication links among the TTP and
the meters could also be compromised.
Based on the semi-trusted servers of the TTP and un-
trustworthy/unreliable communication links, in this paper, we
propose a key management scheme which includes a node
(meter) to the Service Provider (SP) data encryption as well
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2as randomized packet transmission. In our early work [7], the
scheme consists of two independent servers. The master server
manages the public-private key before data is sent to the back
office of the SP. Additionally, the auxiliary server receives the
random sequence of data from the smart meter, in response
to the public key sent by the master server. Both the private
key associated with public key and the random sequence are
used to retrieve the data at the back office. In this paper, we
extend [7] by using Received Signal Strength (RSS) and One
class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) techniques for node
to node authentication. RSS is used for localization of meters
using the received signal strength from neighbor meters. On
the other hand, OCSVM is used to detect new and outlier
data/packet, using current and previous data transmission his-
tory, which has not been considered in the literature to our
best knowledge. The introduction of two separate servers for
key management and random sequenced packet transmission
increases robustness in security in untrustworthy communica-
tion medium and servers. Additionally, OCSVM based node
authentication increases sturdiness in key management system
without increasing any overhead and it is easy to implement
in devices with limited memory and computational ability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the literature review of the security schemes pro-
posed for the AMI. In Section III, details of the proposed
structure of the AMI are introduced. In Section IV, the the-
oretical background of RSS based localization, OCSVM and
entropy of data packet are presented. Section V presents the
communication and traffic flow among smart meters, servers
and SPs. Furthermore, in Section VI, simulation results and
theoretical security strength of a data packet are analyzed.
Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section VII.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
In the recent years, security issues in AMI attracted signif-
icant attention of different communities (electrical engineers,
computer science graduates, IT experts etc.) due to extensive
use of wireless communication. In [8], a 128-bit Asymmetric
Encryption Scheme Galois Counter Mode (AES GCM) cryp-
tography based security IC has been proposed and performance
comparison between the hardware-based and software-based
crypto-engines is presented. In [9], [10], a game theory based
security system has been introduced where two parties (an
attacker and a defender) interact pro-actively and reactively
for different attack severity levels. In [11], several nodes are
selected randomly for intermediate node-to-node authentica-
tion. Even though this reduces the packet overhead, it still
has vulnerability in the middle of communication. In [12],
randomization of the AMI configuration has been proposed
to make its behavior unpredictable to the hacker, whereas
the behavior is predictable to the control center. In [13],
Costas et al. introduced anonymization of data by randomizing
node identity using a TTP. But communication overhead is
increased due to the need for the TTP to communicate with all
nodes simultaneously. Moreover, retrieving information from
a large network becomes complicated. In [14], homomorphic
encryption has been introduced, which also has the problem
of retrieving data from a large network being complicated.
In [15], an Identity Based Signcryption (IBS) for zero
configuration encryption and authentication has been proposed
for end-to-end communication solution. In [16], a node-to-
node encryption with its own secret key has been proposed. But
for a large network, the packet overhead increases for both IBS
and node-to-node authentication. To distribute the keys and
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Fig. 1: AMI architecture consisting of a cluster of
mesh/hybrid connected meters, data concentrator, KMS and
control center.
manage the network, a wireless sensor network based Public
Key management Infrastructure (PKI) has been proposed in
[17] which has problem of generation large number of unique
keys. In [18], a key management system has been introduced
based on DLMS/COSEM standard providing two main infor-
mation security features: data access security and data transport
security. Since DLMS/COSEM is an open standard and allows
a number of variations in the protocol implementation, it
increases the complexity in the client side. In [19], a two layer
security scheme for meter to Data Concentrator (DC) and DC
to control center of SP has been provided in Taiwan. For meter
to DC, IEC 62056 based encryption method, and for DC to the
back office, public key management system has been proposed.
But here in each time step, encryption and decryption need to
be performed twice.
Different than these earlier work in the literature, in our
proposed scheme, we provide improvements in the key man-
agement schemes for AMI systems. In particular, in our
approach, we introduce randomization of data transmission
as well as node-to-node authentication method considering
unreliable communication scenario and using machine learning
technique. The introduction of randomization and the machine
learning based node authentication increases the robustness of
the key management system without increasing any overhead.
III. ARCHITECTURE OF AMI
The AMI is a web like network with millions of meters
as shown in Fig. 1. In here we provide the insights into
AMI architecture, which encompasses components including
home appliances, control center of utility service provider and
security infrastructure.
• Smart meter: It is a solid state device responsible for
collecting, storing and sending data to the back office
using wireless communication and at interval less than
1 hour. The home appliances are connected to a smart
meter by a network, forming Home Area Network
(HAN).
• Neighborhood Area Network (NAN): The meters are
connected among themselves through a mesh or hierar-
chical or hybrid network termed as NAN. The network
may be wired (e.g. PLC) or wireless (e.g. WiFi, ZigBee,
GPRS). The head end of the NAN is the data concen-
trator or gateway which is connected to back office by
a dedicated wired or wireless connection (optical fiber,
cellular network, etc.).
• Control center/Hardware and software control sys-
tem/Utility back office/SP: The control center receives
3the consumption data from the AMI network and uses
them for making bills. This fine grained data can be used
to optimize power generation and distribution. Besides
that, electricity distribution, control, and monitoring is
performed from the control center.
• Master server: In our architecture, the master server is
semi- trusted. When a meter requests the key, the master
server generates a public key and private key pair. The
master server uni-casts the public key to the specific
meter for data encryption and the corresponding private
key is sent to the auxiliary server and control center for
data decryption.
• Auxiliary server: Before the encryption of data with the
public key sent by the master server, the smart meter
generates a random sequence. This random sequence
is sent as encrypted by public key to auxiliary server.
The auxiliary server receives random sequence and au-
thenticates it by the private key of smart meter before
forwarding it to the control center for final decryption.
IV. OC-SVM AND RSS ALGORITHM, AND ENTROPY OF
A DATA PACKET
In our scheme, we use RSS for the localization of meter, and
OC-SVM for node-to-node authentication. In the rest of this
section, we describe the two algorithms, and security strength
calculation of a data packet by entropy in further detail.
A. Received Signal Strength (RSS) based localization
RSS based localization can be used in localizing a new
meter in collaboration with meters whose positions are already
known. The location information is used to authenticate the
source node using OCSVM.
Let us consider an unknown positioned meter at a location
(x, y) accompanied by partially dispersed known position
meters at locations (xl, yl), where 1 ≤ l ≤ n. The received
signal strength at location (xl, yl) can be denoted by ψl
ψl = c− 10γ log(dl) + wl, (1)
where c is an unknown constant that depends on transmitted
power, frequency etc, and γ is the path loss constant. For a
lossy environment, the typical value of γ is 4-6. In our model,
γ = 2.93 has been used considering residential area. The
parameter dl is the euclidean distance between the known and
unknown position meter defined as follows:
dl =
√
(x− xl)2 + (y − yl)2, (2)
and wl is the zero mean random Gaussian noise with standard
deviation σl. The value of σl ranges from 6 to 12 dB.
Let us define, the θ and ψ as θ = [x, y, z]T and
ψ = [ψ1, ψ2, ......., ψn]
T .
The likelihood function of θ for a given RSS measurement ψ,
f(θ|ψ) is given by
f(θ|ψ) = c1 exp
{
−
n∑
l=1
{ψl − c+ 10γ log(dl)}2
2σ2l
}
, (3)
where c1 is a constant.
The Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimate of θ, denoted by θˆ,
can be found from the following equation
θˆ = arg max f(θ|ψ)
= arg min
{
−
n∑
l=1
{ψl − c+ 10γ log(dl)}2
2σl2
}
,
(4)
The above equation is an optimization problem. Various op-
timization techniques such as differential evolution, dynamic
relaxation and particle swarp optimization (PSO) can be used
to solved (4). In our problem, we used PSO to solve the non-
linear optimization problem. Finally, the ML estimator yields
the location (x, y) and reference power z of the unknown
positioned meter
(x, y, z) = {θˆ(1), θˆ(2), θˆ(3)}. (5)
B. OCSVM algorithm
The Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a machine learning
algorithm based on modern statistical learning theory [20],
[21]. It separates two classes by constructing a hyper surface
in the input space. In this input space, the input is mapped
to a higher dimensional feature space by non-linear mapping.
In this section, we describe OCSVM for segregating outliers
from a cluster of data.
Let us consider a data space Ψ = (xi, yi) ∈ Rd
i = {1, 2, 3, ...., n} where xi ∈ Rd is the input data and
yi ∈ {−1,+1} is the corresponding output pattern in the
dedicating class membership. SVM first projects the input
vector x to a higher dimensional space H by a non-linear
operator Φ(·) : Rn ←→ H where the data projection is linearly
separable. The non-linear SVM classification is defined as
Ω(x) = wTΦ(x) + b, w ∈ H, b ∈ R, (6)
which is linear in terms of projected data Φ(x) and non-linear
in terms of original data x.
Class 1 
Class 2
Optimal 
Hyperplane
Fig. 2: Separation of two class in hyperplane.
SVM tries to maximize the separation margin between two
classes of data in hyperplane as shown in Fig. 2. To prevent
SVM from over fitting with noisy data (or create soft margin),
slack variables (ξi) are introduced to allow some data to lie
within the margin. Then the objective function which includes
the minimization of ‖w‖ can be written as
min
w,b,ξi
‖w‖
2
+ c
n∑
i=1
ξi, (7)
such that yi(w
TΦ(xi) + b) ≥ 1− ξi,
and ξi ≥ 0. (8)
4where c > 0 is the regularization parameter that determines the
trade-off of maximizing the margin and the number of training
data within the margin (thus reducing the training errors). To
minimize the objective function of (7) by using the Lagrange
multipliers technique, the necessary condition for w is
w =
n∑
i=1
γiyiΦi(x) (9)
where γi > 0, i = 0, 1, 2.....n are Lagrange multipliers
corresponding to the constraints in equation (8).
The Lagrange multipliers (γi) can be solved from equation
(7) and written as
maxw(γi) =
∑
i=1
nγi − 1
2
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
nγiγjyiyjk(xi, xj) (10)
such that 0 ≤ γi ≤ c,
and
n∑
i=1
γiyi = 0.
(11)
In (10), k(x, y) = Φ(x)TΦ(y) is known as the kernel
function. It determines the mapping of the input vector to a
high dimensional feature space. In this paper, we consider
two kernel functions. The Guassian RBP kernel is given by:
Gaussian RBF kernel: k(x, y) = exp(‖x−y‖
2
σ )
while the Polynomial kernel is given by:
Polynomial kernel: k(x, y) = ((xy) + 1)p
where p ∈ N is the degree of the polynomial function and
σ ∈ R is the width of the RBF function.
OCSVM detects abnormal data within a class [21]. OCSVM
maps the input vector to feature dimension according to the
kernel function and separates it from the origin with maximum
margin. It penalizes the outliers by employing slack variables
ξ in the objective function and controls carefully the trade off
between empirical risk and regularize the penalty.
| | | |w

w
| | | |
p
w
Fig. 3: Feature dimensional space for OCSVMThe quadratic programming minimization function
min
w,ξi,ρ
1
2
‖w‖2 + 1
vn
∑
i=1
nξi − ρ (12)
such that (w · Φ(xi) ≥ ρ− ξi,
and ξi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3, ...., n. (13)
where Φ is the kernel function for mapping, ξi is the slack
variables, v ∈ (0, 1] is a prior fixed constant, and ρ is the
decision value that determines whether a given point falls
within the estimated high density region. Then the resultant
decision function fmw,p(x) takes the form
f(x) = sgn(w∗TΦ(x)− ρ∗) (14)
where ρ∗ and w∗ are the values of w and ρ solving from the
equation (12).
In OCSVM, v characterizes the solution instead of c
(smoothness operation)-
• It determines an upper bound on the fraction of outliers.
• It is the lower bound on the number of training examples
used as support vector.
Due to the high significance of v, OCSVM is also termed as
v − SVM.
Since RSS algorithm can pinpoint the location of neigh-
boring meters based on received electromagnetic signals, and
OCSVM can detect anomaly in input data set, the combination
of these two algorithms makes it possible to identify false
nodes. In our security scheme, OCSVM utilizes packet size,
frequency of data transmission and node identity along with
the node position for meter authentication. The details have
been provided in the next section.
C. Entropy of a data packet
Entropy is used to measure the uncertainty of a random
variable or data packet. The more certain about a value, the
smaller is the entropy value.
The entropy for a sequence S
H(s) =
∑
S P (S = x) log2 P (S = x)
where P (S = x) is the probability of taking S a value over
x.
If the size of a random variable or packet generated by the
meter is n bit, then the entropy and security strength of the
data packet are n and 2n respectively.
V. TRAFFIC FLOW PROCESS
In this section, the privacy scheme implementation process
and the data flow are described in detail.
In our architecture, we assume the following assumption:
• The Master and Auxiliary servers are independent and
semi-trusted. However, the servers might physically be
one but virtually divided into two servers.
• The wireless communication links between servers and
meters are not fully reliable.
• The meters have limited memory and computational
ability.
• The control center has adequate computational ability.
• The meters keep the records of position of neighboring
meters, frequency of transmission, packet size and node
identity. Frequency of transmission, node identity and
packet size are extracted from the packet header. The
node position is derived from electromagnetic signals
using RSS based localization as explained in previous
section IV(A).
• Every meter transmits data at a constant transmission
power.
• The packet size is constant for every meter.
• When a new meter is installed, it starts to record
the position of the neighbor meters, frequency of data
transmission, node identity and packet size.
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Fig. 4: Data flow among various components of AMI.
TABLE I: Symbol notation.
Notation Description
SMi Smart meter i
AEi Asymmetric encryption scheme for
node/ meter i
ki Randomized key generation algorithm
for node/ meter i
Ei Encryption algorithm for node i
Di Deterministic decryption algorithm for
node i
pk Public key
sk Secret key
Mi Message/data of meter/node i
Ci Encrypted data/ Message of node/ meter
i
t Time instance
(m1,m2, .......,mn) ∈ C Segmented packets of message C
(s1, s2, ...., sn) ∈ S Random sequences
(p1, p2, ......, pn) ∈ P Probability of ith packet transmission
at each time instant t
γ Path loss component
δl Variance of random noise
PSO Particle swarm optimization
One-class SVM One class Support Vector Machine
A. Basic Notifications and definitions
The notifications and definitions used in our algorithm are
stated in Table I.
B. Data flow
The data flow (as shown in Fig. 4) among the meters, servers
and control center has be explained here in details.
STEP 1: Initialization
SM1 sends a request for a public key before sending data.
The Master server generates a public key and private key
pair. The public key is unicasted to SM1 for data encryption.
Additionally, the corresponding private key is sent to the
Auxiliary server and the control center.
Key generation by asymmetric algorithm:
AE1 = (k1, E1, D1)
k1 −→ (pk1, sk1)
STEP 2: Encryption
The SM1 generates a random sequence (S). S is encrypted
by the received public key and is sent to the Auxiliary server.
The Auxiliary server receives the cypher text and decodes
it by the secret key. After that the Auxiliary server sends
the sequence S to the control center. At the same time, the
consumption data is encrypted and processed by the following
method:
Encryption of data: pk1 ⊕M1 −→ C1
Segmentation of the encrypted data into n packets: C1 −→
(m1,m2,m3......mn)
Ordering packets by random sequence:
(m1,m2,m3......mn)
S−→ (h1, h2, h3........hn)
STEP 3: Data transmission
The packets are transmitted by the transmitting algorithm as
explained in Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1 Transmitting algorithm
1: Initialization:
2: Generate Random Sequence, St = (s1, s2, ........, sn) at
time instant t
3: if St−1 == St then
4: Go to Initialization
5: else
6: Proceed to next step
7: end if
8: Segment C −→ (m1,m2,m3.....mn)
9: Set Pi = 1Si  P = (p1, p2, p3, ......., pn) where p1 =
1
s1
, p2 =
1
s2
, p3 =
1
s3
..........., pn =
1
sn
10: Transmission:
11: Transmit packet mi chosen from (m1,m2,m3, .....,mn)
with greater probability  probability distribution
(p1, p2, p3, ...., pn)
12: End
STEP 4: Hop to hop data aggregation and forwarding
Based on previous data receiving records containing node
identity, sender node’s position, frequency of data received and
packet size- the node SM2 verifies source node SM1 and
forwards data to the next node SM3. OCSVM algorithm is
used to authenticate the source node. The data aggregation and
forwarding algorithm pseudocode is tabulated in Algorithm 2:
STEP 5: Data retrieval
The control center receives the randomized and encrypted
packets and decodes them by the secret key pk and random
sequence S.
Reordering the data: (h1, h2, h3, ...., hn)
S−→
(m1,m2,m3.......,mn)
Message unification: (m1,m2,m3.......,mn) −→ C1
Decryption: C1
pk−→M1
VI. SIMULATION RESULT AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Simulation result
To get insights into the localization of the meters, we used
a suburban building block topology (Manhattan grid) [22] in
which we used rectangle and hexagon shape as area of interest
(AOI). In an AOI, each edge is a known positioned meter and
the center is the emitter (unknown positioned meter). In Matlab
simulation, we used γ = 2.93 and σl = 12 dB. Furthermore,
for optimization PSO was used whereas residential pathloss
model was considered for pathloss calculation.
With an increase in the number of nodes (meters), the Mean
Square Error (MSE) from the exact position of the meter
decreases as illustrated in Fig. 5. Furthermore, as the variance
6Algorithm 2 Data aggregation and forwarding
1: Initialization:
2: if source meter SMi is new meter then
3: Record data transmission history (frequency of trans-
mission, location of neighbor meter, packet size, node
identity ) for time h
4: Send attach request to control center
5: Receive approval of new meter
6: else
7: Derive SMi’s location from received electromagnetic
signal
8: Get frequency (time difference between two packet
sending), node identity, packet size from header informa-
tion of packet
9: Run OCSVM algorithm
10: if the new data and previous data belong to same group
then
11: Forward data to the next meter
12: else
13: Cease data transmission and report to control cen-
ter
14: end if
15: end if
Fig. 5: MSE from the exact position of the meter vs. Number
of nodes
of noise increases, the MSE also increases as depicted in Fig.
6.
In the second part of simulation using Python, we use
OCSVM for novelty/anomaly detection in a given data set. It
takes node identity, node’s position, frequency of transmission
and packet size as new data set. The previous authenticate data
set or fraction of new data set can be used as training data. In
the simulation environment, we generate random 100 training
observations, 20 normal regular observations and 20 abnormal
observations. The red line (as shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8) is
the learned decision function that separates abnormal data from
the normal regular data. As shown in Fig.7, OCSVM draws a
learned decision boundary based on 100 training clean data, of
which 12 data falls outside the decision boundary erroneously.
Following this, among the 20 regular novel data 3 data falls
outside the boundary and all 20 abnormal data falls outside
the decision boundary. So for 100 training data, OCSVM can
detect anomaly with 100% accuracy (0 error in novel abnormal
detection). If we reduce the number of training samples to 20,
the performance of OCSVM decreases (1 error in 20 novel
abnormal detection) which is depicted in Fig. 8.
Now we use the polluted data for training purposes, which
is a fraction of the input data. There is no separate clean
training sample in this case. We also compare OCSVM with
Fig. 6: MSE from the exact position of the meter vs.
Variance (σ2) of Gaussian noise.
robust covariance estimator for different kinds of input data
distribution. In this case, we generate 100 samples, 10% of
which are outliers/abnormal. For a well-centered and elliptic
input data set, OCSVM and robust covariance estimator show
the same performance as illustrated in Fig. 9. For a bi-modal
distribution of data, OCSVM shows better performance than
the robust covariance estimator. This is depicted in Fig. 10.
For the non- Gaussian distributed input data, the performance
of both the methods degrades, wherein OCSVM shows better
performance than the robust covariance estimator, illustrated
in Fig. 11.
B. Security strength analysis
Let us assume, a meter sends a consumption unit packet
of size 256 bit encrypted by 256 bit asymmetric key to the
central database of control center. If the packet is subdivided
into 32 blocks with each block having a size of 8, and a block
is transmitted each time according to a random sequence, then
the entropy is 256. The security strength of the data packet is
2256.
Furthermore, the security strength of a 256 bit asymmetric
key is 2256/2.
So, for 32 random sequenced packets and 256 bit asymmet-
ric key,
Total security strength of the data packet = 2256 + 2256/2
Hence, a hacker needs a maximum (2256 + 2256/2) number
of iterations (tries) to decrypt a message, which is impractical.
VII. CONCLUSION
In our security scheme, a two-level security method has
been proposed- data encryption and node authentication. In
the data encryption level, encryption by asymmetric keys and
randomization of data packets have been proposed. In the
conventional key management system, only data encryption
is used. On the other hand, in our scheme, randomization
of packets along with data encryption ensures enhanced data
security. Another contribution of our scheme is the introduction
of node-to-node authentication by OCSVM, which utilizes four
variables- meter ID, frequency of data reception from a specific
meter, packet size and meter position. The information of meter
ID, data frequency and packet size is easily extractable from
the packet header. On the otherhand, for meter’s position RSS
is used and it is almost constant due to stationary position of
the meters.
For TTP-to-smart meter communication, we need a bi-
directional communication similar to meter data communi-
cation. Since the communication between meters and servers
7(a) (b)
Fig. 7: Anomaly detection in 40 data with training data size 100. (a) Contour diagram of decision function. (b) Statistics of
error.
(a) (b)
Fig. 8: Anomaly detection in 40 data with training data size 20. (a) Contour diagram of decision function. (b) Statistics of error.
happens once per every session of sending the meter data to
the control center, it doesn’t hamper the normal traffic flow
between the meters and control center. Further, since a random
sequence along with the asymmetric key is used to retrieve data
in the control center, it also helps to verify data flow from a
specific smart meter.
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